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THE SUBJECT OF PRACTICE IN THE LAW
COURSE.
The function of the lawyer may be said to be, in a sense,
to make effective the substantive law. A knowledge of law and
legal principles upon the part of the lawyer is essential only
that he may be able to apply them. In seeking entrance, therefore, into the legal profession, it can hardly be said that it is
asking too much of the candidate that he have not only a knowledge of the law but that he also be proficient to a certain extent
in the art of applying it and making it effective. Such a proposition seems axiomatic.
Before the advent of the modern law school the student
usually received his training in the law office. He was there
instructed in the art as well as the science of the profession by
his legal preceptor and the general results obtained have never
suggested an apology for that system for its time. But changed
conditions and the development of methods of instruction have
rendered, it is generally believed, the old system inadequate,
and the law school has become the logical successor. Should
it not, then, in view of this responsibility, be the aim of the law
school to graduate men qualified as nearly as may be under the
circumstances to take up in a competent manner the practice of
the legal profession. The purely cultural college does not contemplate any particular vocation for the graduate, but the law
school, as the technical and medical schools, is supposed to prepare men for subsequent specific work. It has been somewhat
tardily discovered that the law school is not doing its full part
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when it fails to develop the student as to an essential element
of the duties of the legal profession. In view of the work which
the lawyer. has to do, why should instruction fall short of comparatively complete preparation. Of course, in following any
profession, it is only after years of rich experience that one becomes fully competent, but the student should, before he leaves
school, be as completely endowed with knowledge for his work
as the circumstances of the case will permit.
The law graduate is likely to be noticably deficient in two
essential particulars, namely, in the application of legal principles to concrete cases and in the procedure necessary to develop
a case and carry it through to a final and effective conclusion.
The case system of instruction and the moot court tend to obviate the first weakness by compelling the student to focus legal
principles upon a given point; but the lawyers work is not finished
with a diagnosis of the case,-he must not only prescribe, he
must apply the remedy or make the incision, in a word, he must
operate to make effective the substantive law. It is as to the
latter that instruction in the law school has been, in the past,
most woefully deficient. After a more or less haphazard course,
if any, in the subject of practice, the graduate has been turned
out to seek a further knowledge of the subject wherever he
might find it, and its acquisition has, therefore, been usually
associated with bitter experience, some of which, at least, might
have been avoided, to say nothing of the fact that the interests
of the client are ordinarily of too great value to be trifled with.
As an answer to this most apparent weakness in training, the
law school has heretofore replied that it cannot maintain a legal
laboratory even were it desirable to do so, and a probationary
period in the practitioner's office was, if it is not now, suggested
as the remedy, -in other words, the old system was but partially supplanted. But in view of the changed conditions before
mentioned, entrance into the office of a practicing attorney cannot b6 counted upon, and, even where this is accomplished,
systematic and logically developed instruction and work are not
to be expected,-indeed, instead of their adding the necessary
complement of practice to his knowledge of the substantive law,
the vaunted graduate is much more likely to be humiliated by
the apparent evidence of his incompetence. The burden is,
therefore, shifted to the law school and there it must be eventually assumed.
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An examination of the courses of the principal law schools
of the country has been made to ascertain what is offered in
the subject of practice. While heretofore this subject has been
made conspicuous by the small amount of space devoted to it,
now there appears to be an effort upon the part of the law
schools to vie with each other in elaborate announcement. Some
few schools are still not impressed with the importance of practical work in the subject and they offer but a theoretical consideration of procedure, if we may so speak, while others, apparently
convinced that instruction in the art of practice and pleading is
essential, offer elaborate courses involving, it is stated, all the details of preparation and trial,-one, the University of Denver,
maintaining a department which it denominates a "Legal Aid
Dispensary", through which, by an act of Assembly, students,
when acting for the Dispensary, are permitted to appear in all the
courts of the State to conduct cases as though regularly admitted
tothe bar. In the words of the University Bulletin-'"Meritorious
cases of poor persons who are unable to pay the fees ordinarily
charged by attorneys are taken, and under the direction of an experienced attorney and with the aid of members of the faculty,
the students of the second and third year classes conduct the litigation. Students meet the clients, write up the office docket and
diary, keep the office files, prepare the pleadings and defend
them in court, brief the cases, examine and cross-examine witnesses and argue to court and jury; in fact, conduct the litigation." Such an innovation, though necessarily limited by environment, is certainly more life-like, at least, than the mock
trial of the class room offered by some other schools. Indeed,
it is a question whether the latter "dramatization" pays sufficiently for the time consumed. The several opportunities which
a student may have to interrogate a dummy witness in a lifeless case will hardly make him, in the smallest degree, proficient
in the art of cross-examination, while the time devoted to the
calling and swearing of jurors and witnesses and the performance of other perfunctory duties of court officers incident to a
trial might possibly be devoted to more consequential work.
A knowledge of the manner in which court records are kept and
the way in which the business of the court offices is conducted
is important, but to sufficiently impart the same in the law
school it is not necessary to indulge in the keeping of extensive
records or in the performance of the detailed work of the office.
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While the young lawyer should be somewhat familiar with these
things, he can prepare himself to much greater advantage by
frequent visits to the various offices during the earlier period of
admission to the bar. The writer has found the law student
usually anxious to know but not always willing to learn,
and it might be said here, that if the graduate, after admission
to the bar, does not constantly strive by earnest study to add to
and develop the necessarily limited knowledge acquired in the
law school, his attainments will never be anything more than
mediocre. It is only when within the legal enclosure that the
possibilities of the profession are disclosed, -where study makes
the unfolding of the law a source of constant delight and leads
to profundity, or where sloth hides from the eyes the noble
realms and makes of the lawyer a dolt or a pettifogger.
Every well conceived course in procedure should embrace
a thorough grounding in the principles of pleading and practice, supplemented by illustration and the preparation of papers
by the student corrected and criticised by the instructor. This,
it may be readily seen, can be more satisfactorily done in the
smaller schools. The order of procedure should be so drilled
into the student that he cannot, if ordinarily apt, overlook an
essential step. Of course there are many operations of practice not associated with the trial of a case a knowledge of which
every well qualified graduate should have, and these should be
given such attention as their importance and the available time
make expedient. This more or less theoretical instruction will
not of itself, however, sufficiently qualify the student, -there
must be some practical demonstrating, -he must learn to a certain degree how the work of the lawyer is done. The State
Examining Boards by the scope of their questions are making
it necessary either to treat the more important subjects of practice superficially or else to devote more time to the course. The
procedure involved in every form of action or legal situation
cannot be illustrated, but the ordinary incidents of preparation
and trial, execution and appeal should be fully considered and
illustrated in connection with at least one action in the several
courts. Here a fund of information is acquired that can be applied to almost any action, the special features of particular ones
being separately considered.
It has been the experience of the writer that a most excellent exercise in the teaching of practice is the use of actual court
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papers where they are accessible, and there is no jurisdiction
that is not rich in illustrative papers and records of determined
actions, the temporary use of which will in no way interfere
with the business of the court or impair the records thereof.
Take, for example, the record of a case that has been reviewed
by the appellate court,-say the case of George Hadley vs. The
Atlantic Railway Company. As soon as the student hears the
names of actual parties his attention is secured, -then John Doe
and Richard Roe, even A and B become almost nauseating. Now
the red tape is unloosed and the record unrolled. Here is the praecipe in trespass. The student having been previously instructed
as to the form and purpose of the paper is asked to volunteer
the form of this particular one. How did it become a part of
the record? What is the next step? Did the summons issue or
was this waved and service accepted? If issued, what was the
sheriff's return? Here is given an opportunity for the student
to put to a practical application what he has learned as to service upon a corporation. Service not having been accepted,
how about an appearance? When and how should it be entered?
Was it general or conditional? The method of attacking the
service may be reviewed. Should a statement be filed? If so,
does it make any difference when? Here we have the statement: this always interests the student. We find that through
the negligence and carelessness of the defendant Company,its servants and employees,-in the operation of its trains, the
barn of the plaintiff was set on fire and destroyed, to the loss of
the plaintiff of three thousand dollars to recover which sum he
brings the action. If the declaration consists of "a concise
statement of the plaintiff's demand" its form is approved, if it
is faulty, its form is criticised. There may have been a rule
for a more specific statement, -if so, the form of the application
is requested and the practice as to the same inquired into. The
plea is noted, and when not entered voluntarily, the practice as
to securing the same is reviewed and the form of the paper
requested before the actual paper is disclosed. The record does
not embrace, of course, the operation of setting the case down
for trial, but this gap is supplied by the student. The interval
between setting the case down for trial and the trial is occupied
by the subpoenaing and the preliminary examination of witnesses
-perhaps depositions were taken,-these matters are called
to the attention of the student.
Then comes the stenographer's notes of the course of the trial and the examina-
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tion of witnesses, -a
veritable photograph of the case, a complete record of the development of the actual trial. "A
jury having been duly empanelled, seven sworn and five affirmed, Mr. Johnson opened. the case for the plaintiff at 10-15 a.m."
The instructor may give a "sample opening" or call for a student volunteer. Next comes the examination of witness and
here we have the most perfect imitation of the actual operation
that can be presented, and the exercise in connection therewith
is thought to be far superior to the manufactured make believe
examination of the dummy. The trouble with the latter method
is that the limitations are all excluding, -human nature is practically obliterated,-the mental exercise in connection therewith
amounting to nothing,-while in a consideration of the stenographic report of the examination of the real witnesses we have
everything but his physical presence on the stand. The examination in chief, cross-examination and re-examination are read
by the instructor, and if the witnesses are too numerous, the
important ones only need be considered, selection being so made
that the logical development of the case is preserved. Opportunity is given the class to object to any question, and the reasons for the objections are solicited. If an offer appears on the
record under a call for the same, a student is requested to state
an objection. Any eccentricities of examination are commented
on, mistakes or weaknesses are pointed out, and criticism by the
class entertained. The order of the witnesses is considered as
bearing upon a logical development of the case. The crossexamination is carefully attended to, and as perfect an opportunity is presented for practice as to this as an incomplete knowledge of the facts makes possible, the whole class having the
benefit of volunteer suggestions. The value of such an exercise can be readily appreciated. The "points" are noted and
the general features of a proper closing are touched upon, and
then we have the charge-the subject of exception to the
charge as well as to the rulings of the court being fully considered. The verdict is finally reached and great interest is manifested in the outcome of the case, many questions being suggested by the whole procedure and an excellent opportunity offered for general discussion. The subsequent steps of motion
for a new trial and, possibly, for judgment non obstante veredicto are noted, and finally the incidents of appeal and execution considered.
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In addition to the value of such an exercise in teaching
practice, much applied knowledge of the substantive law is here
presented and appreciated, -for example, in the above case,
among other principles, the doctrine of "particular engine" is
involved. Thus the features of every action and legal process
which it is thought expedient to consider can be graphically
illustrated, and the combination of theory and practice most
happily set forth. The ordinary case of the case book palls before such an entertaining and stimulating reality.
Another helpful exercise is the consideration of a case about
to be tried in the local court. The development of the case can
be ascertained by the instructor and the issue clearly presented
to the class. Opportunity may then be given the class to attend the trial the points of the case being discussed afterward in
the class room. This exercise cannot, of course, be permitted
to interfere with the general work of the school, but a very fair
knowledge of the case can be had even with interrupted attendance upon the trial.
It is thought that with such a course most of the essentials
of practice can be supplied and the law student prepared to do
much of the work which as a lawyer he will have to perform.
FRANK B. SELLERS, JR.
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MOOT COURT.
ALLISON vs. FALLON,
Contract-Acceptance-Revocation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Fallon wrote an offer to Allison to pay him $200 for his horse. He
gave the note containing the offer to a friend to give to Allison. Later
Fallon changed his mind and posted a letter notifying Allison that he
wished to recall his offer. Fallon's friend and the postman with this letter entered Allison's office at the same time and delivered the two notes
simultaneously. Allison opened the note containing the offer at once and
immediately wrote an acceptance of it. This he handed to Fallon's friend
for Fallon. He then turned to his mail and read the note recalling the
offer but did not tell Fallon's friend of its contents. Later Fallon received the acceptance but refused to perform. This is assumpsit.
BRENNAN for Plaintiff.
SAVIDGE for Defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT.
HOFFMAN J.-It appears from the statement of facts, that Fallon
wrote an offer to pay Allison $200 for his horse and dispatched the same
by a friend to Allison. He then changed his mind and wrote a letter recalling the offer. Fallon's friend and the postman entered the office at
the same time. Allison took the letter containing the offer, read it, and
immediately wrote an acceptance. He handed the acceptance to Fallon's
friend. He then opened the letter left by the postman which contained
the revocation of the offer. Fallon's friend had not left his office, but
he did not say anything about the letter. The question here involved is
whether the sale had been consummated or not. I am of the opinion that
it had. There had been a valid offer and acceptance and it would have
been impossible for Allison to recall his acceptance. Fallon should have
claimed the horse. The counsel for the defendant contends that the acceptance had not been dispatched and that Allison could have recalled
his offer. I am of the opinion that it had been dispatched. Fallon's
friend was acting in his stead and was to protect Fallon's interests. Place
the question the other way. Suppose Fallon had wanted to hold Allison
to his bargain and Allison did not want to perform after he had accepted,
by reason of reading the letter. Would Fallon's friend have been protecting his principal's interests if he had allowed Allison to take the letter back. According to a well established rule of contracts the revocation of an offer mast be made known before it is accepted. After it is
accepted it is too late.
9 Cyc. 284 and 78 N. Y. 300, hold that where both parties meet, one
prepared to accept and the other to revoke an offer, the one who speaks
first has the law with him. There is no question about the consummation of the contract. It would be very simple to give Allison damages
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for a breach of contract to the amount he would suffer. But I am of the
opinion that a sale has been consummated and title has passed. For Fallon could, by tendering the $200 have forced Allison to deliver the horse.
Therefore, if you bind one of the contracting parties you must bind both.
In deciding this case I would say, that though this seems to work a
hardship on the defendant yet the -law must clearly draw an inflexible
line, and after it has done this if it were to vaccilate on every
close decision the purpose of the law would be decided by the personal
opinion of the judge who happened to have jurisdiction over it. Altho
believing that this is a severe judgment on the defendant we are constrained to give judgment for the plaintiff for the contract price, provided the plaintiff produces the horse.
Judgment is entered for the plaintiff for $200.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
A contract is made by the acceptance of an offer prior to its revocation. We are unable to find that such an acceptance occurred in this
case.
The offer was revoked, in any view, as far as appears, before the
return of Fallon's friend with the notice of Allison's acceptance. Fallon
authorized this friend to carry to Allison -the offer, but not, it seems, to
bring back Allison's answer. He could not well have expected an instantaneous decision by Allison, and, without such decision, Allison could not
have utilized the friend as the carrier of the announcement of it. We
would be unable to regard the oral communication of his assent to Fallon's
proposal, to the friend, as equivalent to a communication to Fallon. The
putting of the written, but unread communication into the friend's
hands cannot be any better. Neither Fallon nor his friend knew whether
Allison had accepted until the perusal by Fallon of his communication.
As the offer was withdrawn before Allison's answer had reached Fallon,
the effective acceptance of it was impossible.
Let us suppose, however, that Fallon's friend had been authorized to
bring back Allison's answer, so that the delivery of it to the friend would
have been equivalent to a delivery of it to Fallon. Is the delivery of
the answer to be deemed to have preceded the notice to Allison of the
withdrawal of the offer? We think not. Both the offer and the recall
of it, were in writing. They were both put into the hands of Allison at
the same time. This fact we think, makes offer and notice of recall virtually simultaneous. Allison had both papers in his hand at the same
moment. He may have discovered from the character of the writing
that they had both been written by the same person. He opened, first,
the message sent by the friend, and discovered that it was an offer of
$200 for a horse which he may have known to be worth but $50. What
was the meaning of Fallon's sending a letter at practically the same
time, if not to revoke the rash proposal? Allison may then have written
his acceptance, before reading the letter, for the very purpose of being
able to contend that he had concluded the contract, before being fully
aware, although he already suspected, that he had in his hands a recall.
What was going on in his mind we cannot know save by his own disclosure, and his testimony concerning this matter could not be expected
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to be over-candid. It would be inconvenient to make the validity of the
acceptance turn upon inquiries of this kind. It would be unconscionable
to allow Allison to take $200 from Fallon, if he in fact had suspicion that
Fallon had recalled his offer by a letter then in his hands.
But, even if it distinctly appeared that Allison did not look at the
post-delivered letter, and therefore did not know that it was from Fallon,
and did not suspect that it contained a recall of the proposal, we should
think the recall effectual. When knowledge of the recall will be had at any
moment by the use of the offeree's eyes upon papers which invite his instant
examination without change of place, without consumption of appreciable time, without departure from the normal habits of men, we think it
convenient to regard such possibility of knowledge equivalent to knowledge. The knowledge of the revocation began therefore simultaneously
with the knowledge of the offer. There remained no offer to accept.
The actual knowledge of the revocation was gained at the same sitting, and when nothing had occurred or could have occurred to cause any
injury to Allison except the loss of the chance to take advantage of the
rashness or ignorance of Fallon. This circumstance makes the more acceptable the adoption of the principle that the simultaneous delivery
in writing of the offer and revocation, puts an end to the offer and makes
acceptance of it impossible.
Of course, since Fallon had sent the recall, he could not have insisted
on holding Allison to his acceptance.
Judgment reversed.

DUNLAP vs. BINNS.
Ejctmnt-WoodIand-Adverse Possession.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Dunlap sold 300 acres of land in 1870 to Shaffer. In 1875 Shaffer
sold the same property to Binns, but so altered the original description of
his propeaty as to include 100 acres of additional land belonging to Dunlap, who still owned all the surrounding land. All the land in this section
was covered with timber and unimproved at the date of these transactions.
Binns has cleared 10 acres and built a house on the original 300 acres. But
part of the cleared land fenced in lies within the 100 acres. -Dunlap has
had tenants at various points within the surrounding tracts for the whole
period since 1870. But he has had no tenant within the 100 acres. The
fence built by Binns has stood on its present site since 1880.
This is ejectment by Dunlap against Binns for all of the 100 acres
outside Binn's fence.
BROWN for the Plaintiff.
EaSTER for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
HOWER, J.-The question in this case is whether the adverse possession of the defendant under a junior title extends to the whole of his
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tract or only to the extent of his enclosures where there are conflicting
deeds to land causing an interlock, the claimant havingunder the older title
from the beginning had actual possession of a part of his land outside
of the interlock, and the claimant under the junior title having entered
upon and taken actual possession of a part of the interlock, claiming title
to the whole extent of his boundaries.
Binns claims the entire tract-because he has color of title to the 100
acres and has cultivated a small portion of it while the statute of limitations has intervened to perfect his title.
But to acquire a right by the act of limitations requires a possession
of 21 years, actual, visible, continued, notorious, distinct and hostile.Hughes v. Pickering, 14 Pa. 297; Tiedeman R. P. p. 694.
Does Binns' holding contain each and every one of the essentials enumerated above so as to make good his title to the additional 100 acres?
He has held continuously for 29 years, actually, visibly, notoriously, exclusively and hostilly, the part within the enclosure, hence he cannot be
deprived of so much as he has cultivated and enclosed. Dunlap has been
ousted of so much, though he had tenants on the entire tract. But the
plaintiff is not seeking to recover that part. He wishes to recover the
part without the enclosure.
The general rule is that when there is an actual entry upon part of a
tract of land held under color of title the disseisor's possession will be
co-extensive with his boundaries. But there are exceptions to this rule.
To gain a good title by adverse possession through entry made under
color of title, the same essential elements are requisite.
Has the holding been visible or notorious? Could the owner of the
adjacent tract have discovered by passing Binn's property that he had
He did not clear it,
appropriated the balance of the 100 acres?
did not pay taxes, did not fence it, did not cut firewood or fence rails
on it, nor build any building upon it. From the facts he did none of these
things. Surely there was no such open, visible, notorious or distinct act on
the balance of the 100 acre tract as would put the real owner on his guard
when passing the place. [Nothing here under the circumstances-5 years
after the purchase to clear and fence in a little of Dunlap's land-to suggest that Binns was holding a large tract of Dunlap's land under color
of title.]
Suppose Dunlap had noticed the fence included a little more ground
than Binns was entitled to, could he not have mentally decided to give
Binns the ground rather than to go to the expense of a law suit? Because he has given a few acres-we do not know how many, perhaps only
a fraction of an acre-to Bins, shall that act deprive him of nearly a
hundred acres more over which Binns showed at the time absolutely no
dominnion that could be noticed by a passer by.
If a few acres, why not a few square feet be sufficient to carry with
it a 100 acre tract or even more. Under such circumstances a land owner
in a timber district must either be sure to examine the deeds of his
neighbors, or resurvey his boundaries whenever a neighbor has constructed
a new fence at least once within a statutory period, or else he may lose a
large tract of his land.
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It has been held that the occupancy of a few acres is notice of adverse holding of a large tract. But we do not think it should be considered notice of holding under color of title when the occupancy only
takes place 5 years after the transfer of the land. We think that notice
should not follow unless there is such use as shows intention to hold adversly the balance of the tract.
It may be said that the recording of the deed is constructive notice
of adverse possession; that the records are visible and notorious and show
the real intent of the holding. If that is true a property holder of timber land would have to look up the deeds of his neighbors at least once
every statutory period to see that he is not being robbed. This is
most unreasonable, and such a doctrine would be dangerous. Such was
not the intention of the recording laws but rather to give notice to the
subsequent purchasers of the same grantor.-Bates v. Norcross 14 Pick.
224.
Binns had not the actual possession of the land in the interlock though
it might be a constructive possession.
Has the defendant's holding been exclusive and distinct? %Dunlap
has had tenants on different parts of the tract ever since the sale to Shaffer in 1870. The possession of the tract is the possession of the landlord. This actual occupying of a part of the tract gives actual
possession of the whole tract to the landlord.
Binns has ousted
Dunlap of the part under cultivation by continuous adverse possession for the statutory period, but he has shown no dominion over the
balance of that tract that could be considered an ouster.
If one has possession by inclosing of a part of a tract of land which
has known boundaries, and at the same time claims the whole, this is sufficient possession of the whole and the acts of limitation will operate in
favor of the whole, provided no other person has possession in part of an
adjoining tract, the limits of which interfere. In such case the law adjudges the possession of the uninclosed part to be in him who has the
best right and the acts of limitation will have no effect except as to the
part which is actually inclosed.-Cluggage v. Duncan, 1 S. & R. 111.
Burns v. Swift, 2 S.& R. 434; 3 Wash. R. P. 128; Hall v. Powell, 4 S.
& R. 456; Price's Limitations and Liens p. 107.
Therefore we conclude Dunlap was not ousted from his possession of
the balance of the uninclosed land and the plaintiff is entitled to succeed
and the jury should be so instructed.
Is the above opinion in accordance with the authorities? We think
it is in accordance with the later cases. In Ament's Adm. v.Wolf 33 Pa.
331, Wolf took possession and farmed 5 acres of an interlock of 40 acres
and used the remaining 35 acres as woodland' adjacent and subservient
to the farm. The court held Wolf was entitled to the interlock since
he had used it for 21 years.
The court said in Ament's Adm. v. Wolf, "Where owners of conflicting
surveys are both in actual possession within their respective lines, but
neither of them within the interference, the law undoubtedly adjudges
the possession of the interference to be in him who has the right, and
when the other enters upon the interference he acquires title under the
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statute to no more than he actually occupies, All beyond the actual occupancy is still in the possession of him who has the right, but here comes
the question, what is actual occupancy? We hold that enclosing and
cultivating part of the interference, and using the residue as adjacent
woodland is customarily enjoyed, is actual possession of the tract. The
possession which the law imputes to the real owner, be it actual or constructive is ousted by such entry and occupancy and after the statutory
period the title is changed."
In Alden v. Grove, 6 Haines 338, the result of authorities is stated:
"Since the cases of Criswell v. Attemus and those that follow inits wake,
it is vain to deny that the intruder's use of woodland as woodland as ordinarily used, is in the eye of the law, actual possession of it, as truly and
effectually for the purposes of the statute of limitation, as cultivation
of the fields is actual possession of them."
In O'Harra v. Richardson 46 Pa. 388 the court said: "If a party defines his boundaries and takes actual posscssion of a part by clearing or
cultivating, and uses the remainder as farmers usually do woodland, taking timber, tapping trees, and so forth, and does this adversly and exclusively for the period to satisfy the statute, the owner in the meantime
not interfearing, he gains title by limitation."
In our case Binns did not use the land subservient to his cleared tract.
He made no use whatever of it. Hence we cannot see how Dunlap was
ousted, merely by the paper title of Binns without any occupancy of the
balance of the tract.
If he had used it as subservient to his farm and those facts were
shown, then it would be for the jury to find whether Dunlap had not been
ousted and then Binns might succeed. Therefore judgment must be
given to Dunlap.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
Dunlap has been in possession of his land beyond the intrusive line of
Binns, but not within that line. Binns has inclosed a part of his tract,
the enclosure embracing land both beyond the real boundary of Dunlap,
and within it. How large the piece within it is, does not appear. Is the
possession of Binns by enclosure, of this piece, to be deemed a possession
of the whole tract up to the intrusive line? The court below has answered this question in the negative. We think correctly.
Had it appeared that Binns had not only included within his fences a
part of Dunlap's land, but had used so much of the woodland belonging
to Dunlap as is within Binns' intrusive line, he would have been deemed
to have been in actual possession of the woodland as of the inclosed piece
and this possession, continued for 21 years, would have divested the former estate of Dunlap.-Ament's Ex. v. Wolf 33 Pa. 331; Trickett, Limitations, 38; McArthur v. Kitchen, 77 Pa. 62. It does not appear that
Dunlap or his tenants have made any use of the woodland within the interference. If it had, as there could not be a mixed possession, a possession by Dunlap and also a possession by Binns, of the woodland, Dunlap only would have had possession of it, and Binns, even though he also
had used the woods would be deemed in possession of the inclosed
land.-77 Pa. 62.
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Although Dunlap made no use of the woods, it is also true that Binns
made nouse of them. There is no more reason for extending his possession
beyond his fences by construction to his deed botmdaries than for extending Dunlap's beyond his fences, to his deed boundaries. Hence, there
would be no reason for holding .that Dunlap had lost the right to his land
by reason of Binns' possession.
That Binns has by possession. divested the right of Dunlap to the inclosed fields, is not disputed. But he has divested the right to no more.
Judgment affirmed.

GADD v WORLEY
Tort-Duress-LiabIity of Infant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
John Worley, a child of Adam Worley, is possessed of a considerable
fortune in his own right. On Sept. 5th, 1909, Adam directed his son John
to take a cow from the field of Gadd. John knew that his father had
often been charged with stealing and he demurred about taking the cow
in the absence of Gadd. John was twelve years of age at this time and
Adam threatened punishment for his disobedience if he did not do as
directed at once. John obeyed his father. Adam had not bought the
cow and was planning to steal it. Gadd brings trespass against John Worley for the value of the cow.
BARNITZ for Plaintiff.
LOKUTA for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
FOLEY, J.-Counsel for the defendant has cited considerable authority for the proposition that a parent s liable in case of trespass if the
parent is present or even knows that the act was committed, and what is
more, that if he coerced the child as in this case, he is surely liable.-156
Pa. 410. The law is well settled as regards this point We concede that;
but the question, it appears, which we are to decide in this case is whether or not the infant is liable as a joint tort feasor-whether or not there
is a right of action against the minor.
A case in point, with this statement of facts, namely, one in which
an action can be maintained against a minor for a trespass committed
by the command of his parent, together with threats of severe punishment for his disobedience, has not arisen to my knowledge, in Pennsylvania; but from well settled and affirmative doctrines of neighboring
jurisdictions, we find that there is no good reason for allowing such an
action.
It is very true as insisted by plaintiff's counsel, that an infant, as
a general rule, is liable for his torts as any other person would be, and
that liability is the rule without regard to the age of the infant and without regard to whether or not he acted at the command of the father.
When civil injuries are committed, the parent of the perpetrator is not
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regarded.-School Dist. v. Bragdon 23 N. H. 507; Hutchings v. Engel,
17 Wis. 237; Humphrey v. Douglas, 10 Vt. 71.
The reason for holding minors in such cases was stated by Judge
Williams in the case last cited. It is merely dicta, the case having been
decided on different ground than that of commanding an infant to commit
a tort. He reasons that when a person has been injured, he looks to
the one who has committed the offense: he is not bound to look all over
the country for the one that may have prompted the injurious act. We
know of cases where duress was a sufficient excuse for a trespass and
where acts of a gratuitous agent have imposed no liability. So we beg
to differ with the learned judge on this point.
Undoubtedly the reason why we have been unable to find a similar
case in this state is because of the fact that very few infants are possessed of property as the infant here was. The fact of his owning a considerable fortune in his own right appears to be immaterial provided there
is a sufficient excuse for the act.
Torts under actual duress are excused, for it is an unquestioned principle of law that what is done by a person without his consent is not in a
legal sense his act at all. So, in Wallace v. Parker, 5 Cold. 476, Ames'
Tort Cases I, page 194, the plaintiff's cotton was removed by the defendant from the latters gin-house and scattered in the field, under threats
by Confederate soldiers to burn both cotton and gin-house, if he refused
to comply with their demand. This duress was held to be an excuse for
the conversion of the cotton.
Here we have a boy twelve years old, demurring to the command of
his father, whom he has been taught from earliest infancy to honor and
obey. He knew that his father had often been charged with stealing.
If the father had done nothing more and the son had yielded, we might
have held him in conformity with the decisions in Vermont and New
Hampshire cited above, which do not relieve for torts committed under
command of a parent. But what next happens? The child is threatened
with severe punishment for his disobedience if he does not do as directed
at once. He obeys his father. Here we have a person, a mere child,
compelled to do an act which otherwise he would not have done. If the
threats in this case are not sufficient to constitute duress, the court has
a misconception of what goes to make "legal duress."
In Jordan v. Elliott 12 W. N. C. 56, Gordon J.: "Where a person
seeks to be relieved on'the ground of duress per minas regard will be had
to the age, sex, and conditions of life, and if the threats employed were
such as were calculated to deprive one individually of his freedom, he
will be relieved of liability, even though they were not of such a character as would produce a like effect upon a firm and courageous man. It
may indeed be the fear of a weak mind in our case, bift I cannot see how
that helps the matter; to the generous mind that is an aggravation. It
is the weak that are most easily imposed upon, hence the weak in an especial manner need our protention. In this case, the conversion was in
reality not the son's but the father's.
In Weatherspoon v. Woody 5 Tenn. 149, a Confederate soldier took
out of plaintiff's lot a horse and carried him away; he was held in tort
for the converbion, the court noting that the eireumstances were not
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such as to show actual duress. In Drace v. Pawley (1886) 8 Ky. L. Rep.
130, the court conceded that if words of slander by a girl sixteen years
old were spoken under actual duress of parents in theirpresence, it would
be a ground of defense.
This case might be decided on the ground of a gratuitous agency.
As a general rule a gratuitous agent will not be liable if he acts in good
faith and with ordinary prudence. A mere mistake in performing a gratuitous act at the request of another will not create aliability. -Chapman
v. Clements 56 S. W. 646.
Ordinarily, whet. er or not the threats were sufficient to constitute
duress is a question of fact for the jury, but as it comes before us as a
matter of law, we recognize the exception to the general .liability rule,
deem the threats sufficient to overcome the will of the child and render
judgment accordingly for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT,
The law in giving redress for the torts of trespass and conversion
has in view the case of the party injured and the extent of his injury.
The aim of the law is to compensate the party injured without reference
to the defendant's mental processes. The cases, proceeding upon the
propriety of holding persons liable for damages caused by them, direct
their attention to the injury done and ignore the weakness or mental capacity of the person committing the damages, or the absence of any deliberate purpose to injure. See Cooley on Torts 53.
In accordance with this theory it is uniftormly held that an infant
is liable for his torts 22 Cyc. 619, 16 A & E, 307; Gillespie v. McGovern 100 Pa. 144. The liability is not affected by the fact that his act was
committed under the express command of his parent or guardian-22
Cyc. 620; 16 A. & E. Encyc. 308. In Kilpatrick v. Hall 67 Me. 543, an
infant was sued for taking and carrying away lumber. The lower court
instructed the jury that the defendant being a minor would not be liable
if he acted under the direction of his parent. On appeal it was held that
"'minors are answerable for their own torts altho in the commission of
them they acted by the express authority of their parents. The instruction was clearly erroneous." To the same effect, in addition to the cases
cited by thelearned court below, are Smith v. Kron. 96 N. C. 392, 2 S.E.
533; Leary v. Brooks 7 N. D. 554; 75 N. W, 919, Chandler v. Deaton 37
Tex. 406; Scott v. Watson 46 Me. 362.
The defendant cites in support of his defense the scriptural injunction to children of obedience to their parents. No such construction can
be given to the command "children obey your parents in the Lord for
this is right," as to sanction or justify the carrying away of another
man's property. The defense is as unsound in its theology as it is baseless in the law.
A diligent search has failed to discover such authority for the doctrine announced by the learned court below, that, "torts committed under
actual duress are excused." And surely there is just as much consent
on the part of a person acting under duress per minas as there is on the
part of a person acting under the duress of a mental disease. Yet it is
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well settled that insane persons are liable for their torts. Ins. Co. v.
Showalter, 3 Super. Ct. 452.
Mr. Cooley true to the conception of liability in torts as based on injury to the plaintiff declares, "One cannot excuse a tort by showing that
he committed it under duress." For this proposition he adduces no authority, but authority is to be found. In Gilbert v. Stone, 1 Aleyn. 35 in
an action of trespass for breaking and entering a close the defendant
pleaded that twelve strange armed men threatened his life and at their
command he entered the house and immediately returned thro the close.
And upon it was adjudged no plea "for one cannot justify a trespass upon
any other for fear."
This is the correct view. If a man is to secure immunity from injury
by the payment of a price, he, and not an absolutely innocent party,
should pay the price. In O'Leary v. Brooks Co., 7 N. D. 554, 75 N. W.
919 a syllabus written by the court says "a child is no less a trespasser
because the trespass was committed under the control or coercion of a
parent or guardian." The defence of duress is not favored by the law.
Even the criminal law which regards the intent of the actor as an element essential to the criminality of the act declares that duress per minas
shall be a defense only where the injury threatened is the loss of life or
the infliction of great bodily harm. Indeed the Pennsylvania cases admit
duress as a defence only where the injury threatened was the loss of life.
Respublica v. McCarty 2 Dali. 86. A learned legal writer, after stating
the law as to duress as a defence to crime, says "These reasons lead me
to think that compulsion by threats ought in no case whatever to be admitted as an excuse for crime."-Stephen's History Crim. Law, Vol. 2
p. 106.
A contract may be avoided on the ground of duress. Even here the
common law required that the injury threatened should be the loss of
life or limb. In considering duress as a ground for avoiding a contract,
it should be remembered that if it is admitted as a defence, the only party
who will be injured thereby will be the party who made the threats. In
the case of torts, however, if duress is admitted as a defence, the party
injured will be an innocent third party. Even the law of contracts does
not admit duress as a defence to the contract unless the threats were
made by the party with whom the contract was made. If A threatens
the life of B unless he enters into a contract with C, B cannot avoid the
contract unless he can prove that A was acting with the connivance of C.
These considerations lead us to the conclusion that the judgment of
the learned court below should be reversed. It is of course a misfortune
that an infant should be thus placed between two fires. It seems, however, to be a case where the parent by eating sour grapes has set the
teeth of his child upon edge.-Walder v. Parker 5 Cold. (Tenn.) 47, and
Weatherspoon v. Woody 2 Cold. (Tenn.) 149, tend to support the conclusion of the court below. The statements of the second case as to duress
were mere dicta and the first case was a case of bailment and the statements of the court as to duress were taken from Parsons on Contracts.
As to both of these cases it may be said that the transaction it must be
remembered happened flagrante bello and many things are lawful in that
season which would not be permitted in time of peace. Respublica v.
Sparhawk, 1 Dall. 362.
Judgment reversed.
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ALLEMAN vs. CARLISLE MACHINE CO.
Contract-Offer of Reward-Aceeptance
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
The Carlisle Machine Co. offered a reward of $500 for information
leading to the arrest and conviction of the person who fired their plant on
November 7th, 1908. Alleman gave such information, but he was ignorant of the fact that'such reward had been offered, his only motive being
to satisfy a grievance he had against the man convicted. He now brings
assumpsit against the Machine Company for $500.
MORGAN for Plaintiff.
ORCUTT for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
REICHELDERFER, J.-The question in this case is whether it was
actually necessary for the plaintiff to accept the offer to enable him to
recover the reward offered by the defendant.
A reward is an offer of recompense by the government, or by a private person, to whoever will perform some special act.
There is no doubt that the plaintiff fell under the terms of the offer,
and thus became entitled to benefits. The offer, until performance, was
but a mere proposal which could be withdrawn at any time. But as
shown by the facts this was not done, and if the offer was accepted before being withdrawn a contract resulted.
The plaintiff though ignorant of the offer complied with the conditions of the defendant's offer and upon principle he should be as much
entitled to the reward as though he had actually accepted the offer. This
doctrine is upheld in Russell v. Stewart, 44 Vt. 170; Ryer v. Stockwell
14 California 134; Rief v. Paigne, 55 Wis. 496; Drummond v. U. S. 35
Ct. of Claims, 356. All of these decisions decide or hold that a person
can recover the reward offered, without knowledge of the offer by the
claimant. There is no doubt but that the defendant had revoked the offer,
after the performance of the provisions of the offer, and the plaintiff,
acting to revenge a grievance and not to claim the reward, was thus acting in compliance with the alleged contract.
The same rule as applies to contracts applies also to rewards, for as
Clark on Contracts says, page 13; "To constitute a contract, the expression of common intention must generally, if not always, arise from an
offer made by one party to another, and an acceptance by the latter, with
the result that one or both are bound by the promise." Then, since to
constitute a valid contract there must be a mutual assent, or an offer and
acceptance of the offer, the same rule applies as to a reward. But since
the plaintiff had no knowledge of the offered reward, he could not assent
and later recover the reward.
This doctrine is upheld in 4 Kulp (Pa.) 145, where it is held, that to
entitle a person to a reward he must show a rendition of the service required after a knowledge of and with a view of obtaining the reward.
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The same principle is upheld in 51 N. Y. 604; 38 N. Y. 248; 103 California 255; 191 Illinois 510; 37 Conn. 96, and 6 Humph. (Tenn.) 113.
In 52 Pa. 490, it was held that the liability for the payment of a reward is contractual, and 82 Pa. 503 besides corroborating this proposition,
also holds that a reward is a general offer, and acceptance of it by any
person creates a valid contract.
In view of the decisions of cases in the different states, this question
seems to be somewhat unsettled. But as the majority of States hold
that an acceptance is necessary to entitle a person to the reward offered,
and since Pennsylvania is one of these, we hold that the plaintiff is not
entitled to recover and enter judgment in favor of the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
It is not contended that the defendant is liable, unless he contracted
to pay the reward to the plaintiff. The mere intention to pay such reward, the mere announcement of such intention, imposes no liability.
Nor, we think, do these facts plus the actual doing by the plaintiff of the
act which the defendant proposed to reward the doing of, impose a liability,
although some authorities hold that they do.
A contract is made by an offer and the acceptance of it. The acceptance caanot be made without direction of the mind of the acceptor to
the offer. -without intention to accept, and without the objective manifestation of that intention. Alleman did not verbally declare an intention
to accept. The only act which can be construed into an acceptance, is
the act of giving the information. But when that act was done he did not
know of the offer. The act then was produced by, and therefore expressed, no intention to accept the offer. There was no intention 'to accept the offer. An unintended acceptance of the offer would be a solecism.
Hence, we think, the decision arrived at by the learned court below, is
correct, -Howland v. Lounds, 51 N. Y. 604; Mayor of Hoboken v. Bailey,
36 N. J. L. 490; City Bank v. Bangs, 2 Edw. Ch. 95: Frey v. Fond du
Lac. 24 Wis. 204, *State v. Brown, 20 Wis. 237; Larimer v. McLean
County 47 Ill. 36; Fitch v. Snedecker 38 N. Y., 248; Ball v. Newton, 7
Cush. 599; Fink v. Myers 4 Kulp, 145; Cf. Clark's Contracts, 40; Wald's
Pollock Cont. 14. In Brecknock School District v. Frankhouser, 58 Pa.,
380, the district having offered a bounty of $300 to persons who would
enlist to the credit of the district, one who enlisted before the passage of
the act of 1864 which authorized the payment of bounties, and therefore
before the offer of the bounty, was held not entitled. In Cummings v.
Gann, 52 Pa. 485, the claimant of the reward for the recovery of a
stolen horse, who had captured the horse and notified the sheriff of that
fact, before the offer of the reward, was held entitled to it, but the
ground of this right was not considered by the court.
Judgment affirmed.

JOHN TROLLOPE v. CARLISLE BOROUGH
Equity-Boroug,Ordinance-TheatrcaI Performances
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
The Carlisle Council passed an ordinance forbidding all theatres or
other shows for which a license had not been obtained, and fixing the
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license fee at $10. Trollope conducted a theatre during forty nights,
paying no license, This is a bill to restrain the police officers from closing up the theatre in default of the $400. The ordinance required the
officers to close up a theatre the proprietor of which was in default.
HANKEE for Plaintiff.
BARRETT for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
SHAFFER, J.-There are two sources from which every borough derives its power of legislation, viz: the common law and statutory authority.
The case at bar falls under the latter. Since this case comes under the
powers of the borough by statute we need not discuss implied powers or
precedent, but can refer to the act of May 5th, 1876. P. L. 112, which gives
to boroughs the power to regulate, license, and prohibit theatrical exhibitions, concerts, shows, etc. On this act the defendant rests its case.
Nor does the plaintiff attack this right, but makes his plea entirely on
the ground that the ordinance as passed by the Carlisle Council is void
because of an excessive tax, which makes the ordinance unreasonable.
Therefore the question at point is whether the license fee of $10 as required is unreasonable.
In William Trickett's Borough Law § 99 we find the following as regards our case: "Unless there is an express authority from the General
Assembly to legislate on a given subject, or in a given mode, upon the
subject, the validity of the ordinance will depend on the judgment of the
court before which it comes, with respect to certain properties. It must
be deemed reasonable, fair, and impartial."
This would seem to indicate
that where, as in this case, there is express authority, the reasonableness
of the ordinance would not depend on the judgment of the court, but be
absolute on its face.
Yet even if the reasonableness of this ordinance were left to the
judgment of the court, is a charge of $10 per night such an excessive
sum as to be unreasonable, and consequently make the ordinance void?
It is difficult to comprehend the plaintiff's conducting a profitless business and a run of forty successive nights indicates a prosperous business.
Hence we may assume that Carlisle heartily supports its theaters. Also,
we may assume that the Carlisle Council knew this to be a fact. Considering the magnitude of the theatrical performance and the attendance
it cannot be said that a $10 license fee is excessive and hence unreasonable.
But the General Assembly has given to the borough of Carlisle the
power to regulate all its theatrical performances and the plaintiff must
be governed by this ordinance. Therefore, the court can not grant an
injunction to restrain the officers from closing the theater.
34 Sup. Ct. 178; 136 Pa. 519; 100 Pa. 368; and 100 Pa. 182, to which
the plaintiff refers as authority were all cases where the powers of the
borough were not expressly granted by the General Assembly. Hence
the reasonableness, fairness, and impartiality of the ordinances in question were left to the judgment of the court, to be determined by the circumstances of the particular borough, and the cases are not in point.
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Warren Borough v. Geer, 117 Pa., 207 is authority and states clearly
the ground on which this court bases its opinion in the present case.
Bill dismissed.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
The rule that where the legislature, in terms, confers upon a municipal corporation the power to pass ordinances of a specified and defined character, an ordinance passed pursuant thereto cannot be impeached as invalid because it would have been regarded as unreasonable if it had been passed under the incidental power of the corporation
or under a grant of power general in its nature, is well established. In
other words what the legislature distinctly says may be done cannot be
set aside by the courts because they deem it unreasonable or against
sound policy.-Ligonier R. R. v. Latrobe 216 Pa. 221; 21 A. & E. Ency,
989 and cases there cited; Mahonoy v. Hersker 40 Sup. Ct. 55.
The general borough law of April 3, 1851, P. L. 230, sec. 2, granted
to boroughs the power "to regulate and prohibit the exhibition of plays,
shows, mountebanks, juggleries, and all other exhibitions within the
same." The act of May 5, 1876 P. L. 112 expressly conferred upon boroughs "the right and authority to regulate, license or prohibit theatrical
exhibitions, concerts, shows, circuses, mountebanks, juggleries, and all
other exhibitions within the limits of said borough" and to pass such ordinances and by-laws as may be necessary for that purpose.
It will be observed that this grant to boroughs of power to enact ordinances relating to theatrical exhibitions, etc., is as broad in its terms as
it could possibly be made. The boroughs are not only given the right to
regulate but to license and prohibit. There is therefore no doubt that
the ordinance passed by the Carlisle Council was authorized by the terms
of the statutes of 1851 and 1876.
An ordinance of a similar character was sustained in Mahonoy v.
Hersker 40 Sup. Ct. 50.
Judgment affirmed.

POMEROY'S EXECUTOR v. UNDERHILL
Tort-Survival of Right of Action-Act of 1851.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
On July 4th, 1908, Underhill made an unprovoked attack upon Pomeroy and seriously injured him. Pomeroy brought suit on July 30, 1908,
but on August 10th 1908 he died from his injuries received at the hands
of Underhill. Pomeroy's executor has been substituted as plaintiff and
is continuing the action.
SHAFFER for Plaintiff;
PARSON for Defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT.
HOUSEMAN, J.-The facts are well laid down in the argument of the
plaintiff.
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The only question before the court is, can the personal representatives continue an action already begun, when one makes an unprovoked
attack upon another, the person attacked dying from the injuries received, before judgment?
Had the plaintif lived there is no doubt that an action could have
been maintained for the injuries he received at the hands of the plaintiff. But he having died a new set of circumstances arises. Again, at common law the right of the personal representatves to be substituted was
unknown. At common law the right of action died with the person, for
the reason that such a right was personal, and therefore, when the person injured died the right of action died.
The question before us then is, has the Pennsylvania legislature provided for such cases? We think it has. We agree with the defendant
that it has not done so in very plain or explicit language, but then, we
are supposed to interpret the acts of the legislature not too closely, nor
too loosely, but rather we are to give them a free and easy interpretation.
We are to give them the construction the framers intended.
In view of these facts we will quote the 18th section of the act of
April 15th, 1851, which reads:
"No action hereafter brought to recover damages for injuries to the
person by negligence or default shall abate by reason of the death of
plaintiff; but the personal representatives of the deceased maybe substituted as plaintiffs, and prosecute the suit to final judgment and satisfaction. "

This section covers the point at issue, but before giving our construction of thq section we will dwell a moment on section 19 of the same
act.

"Whenever death shall be occasioned by unlawful violence, or negligence, and no suit for damages be brought by the party injured during
his or her life, the widow of any such deceased, or if there be no widow,
the personal representatives, may maintain an action for, and recover
damages for the death thus occasioned."
Hardly is it supposable that the Legislature at the same session and
in the same act would provide for and allow a substitution in one case,
viz: where the action was not begun, and refuse it where the action was
already begun. Such reasoning would be devoid of all logic and common
sense. To say that the substitution is allowed where the injury was
caused by negligence and that it is not allowed where the attack was
wilful would be to encourage crime, lying, etc., for one could escape by
saying that the attack was wilful and that the injury was not due to
negligence.
Again, where the action is begun we have the manifest intention of
the party injured to seek reparation, while, in the case wherethe injured
dies before the institution of the suit, he may, or may not, intend having
reparation; and to say that where there is no intention expressed, one
has a right to allow the representatives to take up the case, and that
where the intention is expressed, no such right is allowed, as was said
before, is devoid of all reason and we think it was not the intention of the
law makers so to legislate.
The 18th section provides for cases where the action is alreadybegun
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and we think the 19th section, which clearly allows reparation where the
attack is wilful, is only one step further and provides for cases even
where the'action is not begun.
The words "negligence and default" in the 18th section and "unlawful
violence or negligence" in the 19th section are synonymous. "Default"
means a failure, or defect, 'neglect to do what duty or law requires."
An assault upon another is a neglect to do what the law requires, or
rather a violation of what the law forbids and therefore a default.
There seem to be no cases on the point at issue but in Fink v. Garman 40 Pa. 95 altho the case is one involving negligence and was decided
on that point, the trial court judge commented on the expression "by
negligence or default." He says in part:
"Through the great carelessness and want of skill in those who prepare our statutes, we are often left to grope in darkness for their
meaning, yet we cannot believe that it was intended by the variance of
wordA in the 18th and 19th sections to give a remedy in the one case
which is withheld in the other; that where a party was sued in his lifetime a recovery could be had by his personal representatives being substituted, for his death arising by negligence or default; and when the suit
is brought after his death it must be caused 'by unlawful violence or
negligence.' In our opinion the Legislature meant the same thing in
both cases. Our lexicographers teach us that 'default' means a failing or
failure, or defect, 'neglect to do what law or duty requires'. We should
have no hesitation in saying that, under the 18th section, if a partywould
do an act in violation of law, or neglect to do what the law required, by
which another shodld be deprived of life, it would be then his 'default',
and therefore an action would lie; or, that suit commenced during the
life time of the injured party could be prosecuted to judgment after his
death, although the injury arose from an unlawful act of violence. And
to say that if the deprivation of life were immediate, by which no action
could be brought in his lifetime, there would be no remedy, would be to
'stick to the letter' losing sight of the main object of the statute."
Again, the first expression used in the first section of the act of 1855,
limiting the right of recovery of damages "to those who stand in certain
relations to each other," still further tends to show the legislative meaning of "persons entitled to recover damages for any injury causing death",
from which we may infer that the legislature understood the action could
be sustained for any injury by which another should be deprived of life.
We, therefore, feel ourselves at liberty to apply the remedy to any
unlawful act done by a party, resulting in a fatal injury to another,
whether attended with unlawful violence or negligence, or through 'default' of performing a duty required by law. The defendant's motion for
non-suit is overruled and the case must go on with Pomeroy's executor
as plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
Pomeroy brought an action against Underhill, for injuries suffered
from an attack by the latter. He then died. The action was for injuries to the person. The 18th section of the Act of April 15th 1851, ordains that no action to recover damages for injuries to the person by
negligence or default shall abate in consequence of the death of the
plaintiff; and that his personal representative may be substituted.
The only question then is whether the action sought damages for injuries by "negligence or default." The act of Underhill was hardly a
e
apparently intended to do exactly what he did. It
negliento
does not appear that the effect of his act, the injuries or even the death of
Pomeroy, was unintended. The injury of Pomeroy was hardly the result of negligence.. °
Was it the result of "default"? The word "default" often designates some omission to act, some default of action. One who does not
pay his debt defaults. But it is not confined to this negative sense. A
trustee who misappropriates the funds, also defaults. One of the defi-
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nitions of the word is "a fault; any offense; a misdeed; a wrong act."
Century Dictionary. Chaucer furnishes that authority an instance of
this use.
Never shall he more his wyf mistriste (mistrust)
Though he the soth (truth) of hir defaulte wiste (know).
Another instance is from Quarles:
Thine own defaults did urge
This two-fold punishment; the [tread] mill, the scourge."
One of the meanings of the word according to the Standard Dictionary, is "a wrong action; fault; transgression". Cf. 13 Cyc. 759.
The words of the act of 1851 are "negligence or default". Negligence covers omissions or imperfections of action. Default was, we
think, intended to cover positive acts which are wrongful, acts of violence, acts forbidden by the law.
There would be no motive to preserve from abatement an action
brought to redress a wrong consisting in the effect of negligence, which
would not require action founded on intentional injuries, to be preserved
also.
We think the conclusion reached by the learned court below irrefragable.
Affirmed.

BOOK REVIEWS.
Law Office and Court Procedure. GLEASON L. ARCHER, L.
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valuable is the treatment of the subject of the examination of witnesses.
Many specimens of direct and cross examinations are given, together
with useful suggestions for the proper conduct of them, with a view to
extracting the truth and avoiding dangerous pitfalls. The text, covering
somewhat nore than 300 pages can be read in a few hours, and its perusal will well reward even the experienced attorney. It must be of'great
value to the beginner.
Pocket Code of the Rules of Evidence on Trials at Law.
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, Little, Brown & Co., Boston. 1910.
The immense debt contracted by the legal profession for his investigations and elucidations of the law of evidence, to Prof. Wigmore is
generally recognized by all competent judges. His principal work covering four stout volumes, he has done well to prepare this "Code" for
rapid use in the hurry of a trial. He states his object to be "to provide
the practitioner wlth a handy summary of the existing rules of evidence;
and at the same time in a scientific form capable of serving as a code."
The book contains 600 printed pages. Its alternate pages are blank.
The paper will receive ink so that annotations by the user can be made
on these unprinted pages. The dimensions of the book will allow of its
being slipped into the coat pocket. It is bound in flexible covers. An
index of topics covering 79 pages makes reference to the body of the
book easy and rapid. This and the opus .nagnum will doubtless in a few
years supersede all other books of reference in the department of evidence. Every trial lawyer will as soon as he realizes what the code is,
feel constrained to purchase it, and to make it an intimate vade-mecum.

